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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher M. Taylor appeals pro se from the judgment of dismissal
entered upon the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2011, "Taylor pied guilty to one count of aggravated battery upon a
peace officer, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907 and 18-915, enhanced for being a
persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514, and also enhanced for the use of a deadly
weapon, I.C. § 19-2520." State v. Taylor, Docket No. 39844, 2013 Unpublished
Opinion No. 610, p.1 (Idaho App. August 1, 2013). 1

Taylor also entered an

Alford 2 plea to a second count of aggravated assault on a peace officer with a
persistent violator enhancement. See

kl

See also R., p.58.) The district court

imposed concurrent fixed life sentences and denied Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion
requesting leniency.

kl

at pp.1-2.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed,

rejecting Taylor's claim that his sentences are excessive.

kl at pp.2-5.

Taylor signed his pro se post-conviction petition one year after the Court
issued its Remittitur in Taylor's direct appeal. (R., pp.6, 9-10.) In his petition,

1

The district court took judicial notice of the following documents from Taylor's
underlying criminal case: (1) "the Change of Plea Transcript from August 29,
2011 "; (2) "the Sentencing Transcript from December 5, 2011 "; (3) "the Order
Denying Rule 35 Motion dated April 25, 2012"; and (4) "the Idaho Court of
Appeals Unpublished Opinion No. 610 filed on August 1, 2013." (R., p.25.)
2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

1

Taylor alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both his trial
attorney and his appellate attorney.

(R., pp.6-8, 21

3)

Taylor also filed a

motion for appointment of counsel. (R., p.14.)
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Taylor's petition,
which included a denial of Taylor's request for counsel. (R., pp.24-39.) Taylor
filed a response to the court's notice after which the district court entered an
order and judgment dismissing Taylor's petition. (R., pp.47-68.) Taylor timely
appealed. (R., pp.70-72.)

3

Page 5 of Taylor's post-conviction petition was not submitted when Taylor
originally filed his petition; Taylor filed page 5 separately after the district court
notified him of the defect. (R., pp.19, 21-22.)

2

ISSUE
Taylor's statement of the issues on appeal is included at page 2 of the
Appellant's Brief. The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: Has Taylor failed
to show any basis for reversing the district court's order summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition?

3

ARGUMENT
Taylor Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court's
Summary Dismissal Decision
A.

Introduction
Taylor challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition.

(Appeiiant's Brief, pp.2-7.)

Review of the judicially noticed documents from

Taylor's underlying criminal case, and application of the correct legal standards
to the claims in Taylor's petition, shows Taylor has failed to demonstrate any
basis for reversing the district court's summary dismissal decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Taylor Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision
Summarily Dismissing His Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,

4

583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
§ 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence

to summary dismissal pursuant to I.

raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

The district court properly

dismissed all of Taylor's claims without an evidentiary hearing.
In his first and second claims, Taylor alleged his trial attorney was
ineffective for "allow[ing] him to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that
offered no advantage whatsoever over proceeding to trial" and for failing to
object to the imposition of what Taylor believes is an illegal sentence. (R., pp.7,
22.) Taylor further asserted that neither his counsel nor the court advised him
that the court could impose a maximum fixed life sentence. (R., p.56; see also
R., p.31.)

The district court properly dismissed the allegations contained in

Taylor's first claim because they are unsupported by the record or the law.
The advantage of Taylor's plea agreement included the dismissal of two
additional charges and the ability to argue for leniency at sentencing. (#39844
Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20.) Further, as noted by the district court, the transcript of the
change of plea hearing contradicts Taylor's assertion that he was not advised of
the maximum possible penalties for his offenses.

(R., p.63.)

After the court

advised Taylor of the maximum penalties for both charges he agreed to plead
guilty to, the court advised Taylor of the consequences of the deadly weapon
enhancement, and the consequences of the persistent violator enhancement, to
which Taylor also agreed to plead guilty. (#39844 Tr., p.11, L.1 - p.15, L.24.)

5

Specifically, with respect to the persistent violator enhancement, the court asked
Taylor if he understood that the "maximum penalty that [he] would face would be
a minimum of five years in the state penitentiary, which could be extended to
life." (#39844 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Taylor answered: "Yes, sir." (#39844 Tr.,
p.15, L.24.) Taylor's allegation that he was never advised of the potential for a
life sentence is "insufficient for the granting of relief [because it is] clearly
disproved by the record." Gootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630
(Ct. App.1996) (citing Cooperv. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975)). The district correctly dismissed this claim on this basis. (R., p.63.)
On appeal, Taylor appears to argue that the district court erred in rejecting
his claim that he was not advised of the consequences of his guilty pleas
because, Taylor asserts, there would be no reason for him to plead guilty to two
fixed life sentences.

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

Taylor did not, however, plead

guilty to two fixed life sentences, he pied guilty to offenses which subjected him
to a maximum life sentence, which the court imposed. That Taylor may regret
pleading guilty without an agreement as to sentencing does not mean he was not
advised of the maximum penalties; the record clearly shows Taylor was so
advised. Moreover, to the extent Taylor's appellate argument is predicated on a
claim different than the one he raised in his petition, the Court should decline to
consider it.

I.C. § 19-4903 (an application for post-conviction relief must

"specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and
clearly state the relief desired"); Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523-24, 236 P.3d
1277, 1283-84 (2010) ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of

6

I

action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110-11, 15 P.3d
820, 823-24 (2000) (district court did not err in summarily dismissing postconviction petition without considering claims neither alleged in the original
petition, nor properly before the court in an amended petition filed without leave
of the court).
Taylor's post-conviction claim that his sentences are illegal, and that his
trial counsel should have objected to his sentences for this reason, is based on
Taylor's erroneous belief that the persistent violator enhancement does not allow
a court to "fix" the enhanced portion of the sentence.

(R., pp.7, 22.) In other

words, Taylor believes a court can only fix the maximum penalty authorized by
statute for the substantive crime. (R., p.22.) Section 19-2514, I.C., reads:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of
a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state
of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be
considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction
shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of
correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and
said term may extend to life.
Nothing in the plain language of the persistent violator enhancement statute, I.C.
§ 19-2514, nor the cases interpreting that statute support Taylor's claim. The
district court correctly concluded as much. (R., pp.64-65.)
On appeal, while Taylor reasserts his claim that a court cannot impose a
fixed life sentence pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514, he cites no authority to support
this assertion, and the state is unaware of any.

7

The Court should, therefore,

either decline to consider Taylor's argument or reject it as contrary to law.
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not
be considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to
consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or
legal proposition to support his argument").
As part of his first claim, Taylor also alleged his sentence on the
aggravated

battery

charge

is

illegal

because

the

state

charged

two

enhancements in relation to it - one for a deadly weapon' and one for a
persistent violator - and because he believes it violates double jeopardy to
enhance aggravated battery with a deadly weapons enhancement.

(R., pp.7,

22.) The district court correctly dismissed both of these assertions. (R., pp.3334, 65.)
The Idaho Supreme Court considered a similar claim regarding multiple
enhancements in State v. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185, 187-188, 141 P.3d 1054,
1056-1057 (2006). The defendant in Kerrigan "argue[d] the district court erred in
imposing two sentence enhancements to his single substantive offense for
aggravated battery" - one based on the victim's status as a law enforcement
officer and one for use of a deadly weapon.

Kerrigan claimed that both

enhancements could only be applied to the aggravated battery charge and could
not be "stack[ed]" on each other.

19.:_ at 188, 141 P.3d at 1057. The Court

rejected Kerrigan's argument for "two reasons."

kl

"First," the Court explained,

"the district court had statutory authority for each enhancement considered

8

separately" and the "pertinent statutes contained no language prohibiting both
enhancements from being attached to a sentence for a single substantive crime."

kl

"Second, the two enhancements added to Kerrigan's sentence were not

duplicative, and the application of both enhancements to a single substantive
offense thereby serves the legislature's intent to deter the conduct proscribed by
each of them."

kl

The weapon enhancement "discourage[s] the use of deadly

weapons in the commission of other crimes, while the enhancement for assault
or battery upon a law enforcement officer is designed to protect those who
preserve the public welfare."

kl

"Since they deter and punish separate aspects

of the criminal conduct to which Kerrigan pleaded guilty, each serves a separate
and legitimate purpose."

&

Although not entirely clear, Taylor's complaint seems to revolve around
the application of both the weapon and persistent violator enhancements to his
aggravated battery charge, as opposed to the enhancement based on the fact
that his victim was a member of law enforcement. (R., p.7.) With respect to the
aggravated battery charge, the court stated its fixed life sentence was "inclusive
of the deadly weapon and persistent violator enhancement." (Tr., p.87, L.22 p.88, L.5.)

As an initial matter, it is unclear how the district court could

meaningfully "stack" the applicable enhancements in this case given that the
persistent violator enhancement allows for life and effectively subsumes the 15year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon.

Nevertheless, nothing would

prohibit a court from stacking the enhancements in this case. As in Kerrigan,
nothing in either enhancement statute, or any other provision of law, limits the

9

state's ability to seek two enhancements or the court's ability to impose sentence
based on two enhancements, and both enhancements "deter and punish
separate

aspects"

of Taylor's

criminal

conduct.

The

deadly weapon

enhancement, I.C. § 19-2520, "serves to discourage the use of deadly weapons"
in the commission of certain enumerated offenses, including aggravated battery,
Kerrigan, 143 Idaho at 188, 141 P.3d at 1057, whereas the persistent violator
enhancement provides greater punishment for repeat felony offenders, I.C. § 192514. Application of both enhancements to Taylor's criminal conduct was not
illegal. Taylor has failed to show error in the district court's rejection of this claim.
Taylor has also failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his
double jeopardy argument. "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
and Idaho Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense." State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 256
P.3d 776, 778 (2011) (citations omitted). The only offense for which Taylor was
punished is aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. That the definition
of aggravated battery includes committing a battery using a "deadly weapon or
instrument," I.C. § 18-907(1 )(b), does not mean the punishment for committing
an aggravated battery in this fashion cannot be enhanced.

In fact, I.C. § 19-

2520 expressly provides that it applies "even in those cases where the use of a
firearm is an element of the offense." It is well-within the legislature's purview to
enhance a sentence in this fashion. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773,

10

778-779 (1985) (if "the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the
legislative history" that a defendant can be convicted and punished under
different statutes for the same conduct, there can be no double jeopardy
violation); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("With respect to
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause
does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended.").

The district court did not err in

dismissing the double jeopardy aspect of Taylor's first post-conviction claim.
In his third and final post-conviction claim, Taylor alleged:
[My] original and appellate attorneys, individually and/or collectively
provided ineffective assistance when they failed to challenge the
contradiction between the precepts of North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970) and the sentence handed down in the instant
matter. That failure resulted in a much longer sentence being both
available and prescribed [to] the petitioner, then would otherwise
have been possible. Simply said, its [sic] almost impossible to
justify the acceptance of a plea bargain that results in a fixed life
term under an Alford plea.
(R., p.7 (italics original, bold omitted).)
The district court understandably found this claim vague, but in attempting
to address it in its notice of intent to dismiss, the court accurately noted Taylor
was apprised of the potential enhanced penalties for the aggravated assault
charge, to which Taylor entered an Alford plea.

(R., p.37.)

The court also

accurately noted that, upon acceptance of Taylor's guilty plea, the court could
impose any sentence authorized by law regardless of whether the plea was
entered pursuant to Alford. (R., p.38.) Accordingly, the district court summarily
dismissed Taylor's third claim. (R., pp.65-66.)

11

Taylor provides no cogent argument supporting his claim that the district
court erred in dismissing is Alford-based claim. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Rather,
his argument is that it is "almost impossible to justify the acceptance of a plea
bargain that results in a fixed life term under an Alford plea[.]" (Appellant's Brief,
p. 7.) The Court should decline to consider this assertion as it is unsupported by
any relevant legal authority.

Murray, supra.

argument is without any basis in law.

This is likely so because the

Thus, whether the Court declines to

consider Taylor's argument based on his failure to cite relevant legal authority, or
rejects it because no authority exists to support his argument, Taylor has failed
to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing claim three of his petition.
Because Taylor has failed to show any error by the district court, he is not
entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the district court's order dismissing Taylor's petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2015.

JESS

Deput

12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of December, 2015, I caused
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A M. LORELLO
JES
Dep y Attorney General
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